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DIRECT DEMOCRACY  
AND STATE FISCAL CRISES:  
THE PROBLEM OF TOO MUCH LAW 
PETER CONTI-BROWN* 
The recent debate concerning state fiscal crises has appropriately 
focused on the question of money: that is, the money states have 
committed to their employees, bondholders, and citizens, and the 
implications of economic recession for those promises to pay.1 In that 
sense, the debate is not strictly about state fiscal crises, but state debt 
crises, and proposals to resolve them focus on ways in which the states 
can restructure these debts in order to avoid the crisis entirely.  
This focus on debt is understandable. The collective debts of the 
several states are staggering, and states frequently rely on unrealistic 
projections of tax and pension fund growth that, during an economic 
decline, may render the states unable to meet those obligations.2 
But what if the problem facing the American states is not a 
problem of too much debt, but one of too much law? Put differently, 
state debt crises might be symptomatic of a deeper crisis whereby the 
state fiscal policy-making process is gummed up by statutory and 
constitutional restrictions on the use of public resources, such that 
combating budgetary shortfalls—whether caused by economic 
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 1.  See, for example, David Skeel, State Bankruptcy, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012), 
for an overview.  
 2.  See generally Olivia Mitchell, Public Pension Pressures in the United States, in WHEN 
STATES GO BROKE: THE ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN 
FISCAL CRISIS (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012) [hereinafter WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE] (providing an overview of state pension obligations). 
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recession, political gridlock, or some combination of the two—
becomes increasingly unlikely. This essay takes a look at that issue: 
state fiscal crises and the problem of too much law.  
This problem broaches two sequential, but otherwise unrelated, 
dynamics: lawmaking by direct democracy on the one hand, and fiscal 
federalism and the moral hazard it can create on the other. First, in 
the states that allow them, constitutional amendments by direct 
democracy—whether by popular initiative or by legislature-approved 
referendum—can place unyielding restrictions on the state budgets 
that, in times of crisis, may render the state unable to meet its fiscal 
demands. Add this dynamic to the frequently dysfunctional fiscal 
policy processes so often associated with these same states’ 
legislatures and the result can be fiscal deadlock and, potentially, fiscal 
crisis.  
Second, while direct democracy can create other problems for a 
polity, the risk of moral hazard that inheres in fiscal federalism can 
make direct democracy a problem for those who do not participate in 
it. In a federal system such as exists in the United States, state fiscal 
crises create moral hazard easily, as states take risks that they hope 
the federal government will absorb. If the federal government agrees, 
federal taxpayers would thus absorb the losses of state fiscal crises in 
a way that, if history is a guide, can distort political conversations 
regarding fiscal policy and push the costs of risky behavior to those 
who do not enjoy the benefits. The interaction between these 
problems—the potential instability of fiscal policy by constitutional 
amendment and the risk of moral hazard in a federal system—is an 
important and understudied dynamic of state fiscal crises.  
This essay is not the first to observe that democracy influences 
fiscal crises. The problem is that “voters do not fully understand the 
relationship between current deficits and future taxes—they simply 
reward spending and punish taxation.”3 As one commentator on the 
state of California’s fiscal affairs colorfully put it, the Californian 
experience is that its citizens expect to be “taxed like libertarians, but 
subsidized like socialists.”4 Add to the paradoxical—but fully 
rational—preference for taxes and subsidies the penchant for using 
 
 3.  JONATHAN RODDEN, HAMILTON’S PARADOX: THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF FISCAL 
FEDERALISM 21 (2006) (citing JAMES BUCHANAN & RICHARD WAGNER, DEMOCRACY IN 
DEFICIT: THE POLITICAL LEGACY OF LORD KEYNES (1977)).  
 4.  Troy Senik, Who Killed California?, NAT’L AFFAIRS, Fall 2009, at 60, available at 
http://www.nationalaffairs.com/doclib/20091229_Senik_Fall09.pdf.  
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laws promulgated via direct democracy to bind the hands of 
legislators in the fiscal policy-making arena, and the result may be a 
dysfunctional fiscal policy process.  
This symposium essay offers a preliminary, counter-intuitive 
solution to this unholy confluence of direct democracy, fiscal policy 
sclerosis, and federation moral hazard: the use of direct democracy to 
combat direct democracy, thereby providing protection to federal 
taxpayers exposed to losses by state fiscal crises. Taking a cue from 
the Financial Review Board5 system seen in the municipal bankruptcy 
context, this essay proposes a state constitutional amendment by 
referendum or initiative that dislodges the fiscal policy-making 
process from the legislature and referendum-burdened state 
constitution. In place of these traditional fiscal policy-making regimes, 
the referendum6 would accept the authority of a federally created 
commission called the Fiscal Restoration Commission (FRC). The 
FRC would then recreate the state’s budgetary laws from the ground 
up. The release of federal funds to save a state’s fiscal affairs would be 
contingent on the adoption, again by referendum, of the FRC’s 
proposals. The result would be a clearing of restrictive law, rather than 
the clearing of restrictive debt, the focus of most state restructuring 
proposals offered until now.  
This essay explains this proposal in detail and assesses several 
legal and policy arguments against it. Perhaps befitting a proposal 
grounded partially in constitutional law but advanced by a student of 
business law and bankruptcy, the arguments are necessarily tenuous 
and preliminary. But however preliminary, the problem the proposal 
seeks to address is not far-fetched. The interaction of state fiscal crises 
and direct democracy is a potentially serious one; the risk of moral 
hazard in a federalist system is high; and the present regime is ill-
equipped to resolve the problems, particularly in times of crisis when 
the problems are on fullest display.  
 
 5.  “Financial Review Boards” are also known as “Financial Control Boards.” See, e.g., 
Note, Missed Opportunity: Urban Fiscal Crises and Financial Control Boards, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 733, 735–45 (1996). For reasons explained below, I prefer “Financial Review Boards.” 
Infra note 27. 
 6.  Except where noted, I use the term “referendum” to refer to any mechanism whereby 
the populace accepts or rejects changes to state statutory or constitutional law, irrespective of 
the origin of such law. As such, the use of the term encompasses both voter-directed initiatives 
and legislature-directed referenda. I do so only for concision and euphony. There are key 
differences between referenda and initiatives that are relevant to this discussion only where 
noted.  
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The benefits of the proposal are several. First, it allows the extent 
of the states’ fiscal crises to manifest itself fully before a structural 
overhaul is needed. As many scholars have noted, the problem of 
state fiscal crises is political, not economic.7 In order for the FRC to 
be triggered, the political regime already in place must be incapable 
of resolving the fiscal problems that its state faces. This mechanism 
protects the proposal from being exploited for partisan, rather than 
fiscal, ends. The structure proposed here would only come into play 
when its citizens determine that the state is actually and squarely 
faced with the prospect of defaulting on its debts, whether to its 
employees, its citizens, or its bondholders. And because there may 
well not be, at present, a connection between direct democracy and 
fiscal crises,8 structuring a solution that waits for a problem to 
manifest itself does not presume the problem it awaits to resolve.  
Second, the proposal allows for a nonpartisan mechanism to 
evaluate the many statutory and constitutional restrictions on a state’s 
budget and provides the state with a streamlined alternative to its 
own budget-making process. And third, it goes deeper than a simple 
restructuring, allowing a constitutional amendment to do away with 
decades of accumulated, perhaps inconsistent, budgetary restrictions 
that can clog a state’s ability to navigate fiscal crises.  
The main aim in this essay is to create a space for discussion of the 
problem of too much law in the context of state fiscal crises—a 
problem the existence of which should be more fully established by 
empirical analysis, especially concerning the most recent state debt 
crises and their relationship to direct democracy. The FRC proposal 
offered here is intended to be strictly nonpartisan: it must offend or 
please parties on the left and right alike if it is to be successful. Any 
aspect that strays into one corner or another should be criticized and 
modified; the entire purpose is to create a mechanism that identifies a 
failure of partisan politics and uses nonpartisan decision-making to 
overcome that failure. The proposal’s very plausibility, from an 
academic perspective, depends on the ability to supersede political 
considerations.  
 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism; Adam J. Levitin, 
Fiscal Federalism and the Limits of Bankruptcy; Damon A. Silvers, Obligations Without the 
Power to Fund Them, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 2.  
 8.  See, e.g., John G. Matsusaka, Direct Democracy and Fiscal Gridlock: Have Voter 
Initiatives Paralyzed the California Budget?, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 248, 249–50 (2005).  
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The essay proceeds as follows: Part I provides the background of 
the problems described above. Part I.A describes the problem of 
direct democracy in the context of fiscal crises, using California as an 
example. Part I.A also describes the problem of fiscal federalism and 
explains how moral hazard can result in this context. Part I.B then 
describes the mechanism used to override a similar problem in an 
analogous context, namely the establishment of Financial Review 
Boards that oversee municipal bankruptcies.  
Part II turns to the solution and describes the Fiscal Restoration 
Commission, explaining its many components based in state and 
federal law, as well as the importance of institutional design in 
creating the FRC. Part III addresses the constitutional and policy 
counterarguments, while also distinguishing the FRC from the 
category of solutions generally referred to as “state bankruptcy,” 
which address the related—but distinct—problem of excessive state 
debts.  
I. THE POPULAR CONTEXT OF FISCAL CRISIS 
A. State Fiscal Crises and Direct Democracy in Context 
Fiscal crises in the American states are as American as Pop-Tarts. 
The presence—and more especially, the threat—of fiscal crises have 
been a part of the political discussion since the American states have 
existed as cognizable legal entities. This dynamic is unlikely to change. 
And yet, as economists Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo and John Wallis have 
noted, “[h]ope springs eternal in America, . . . and for close to 200 
years, state governments and their citizens have regularly tried to 
prevent the next crisis from occurring by changing the constitutional 
rules that constrain state government taxing, spending, and 
borrowing.”9 
Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis call these efforts “fiscal 
constitutions.”10 As Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis describe them, they 
come in four stripes.11 The first, and most common, is the 
constitutional imposition of procedural requirements that limit the 
amount or variety of debts that a state can issue.12 Second are the 
 
 9.  Isabel Rodriguez-Tejedo & John Wallis, Fiscal Constitutions & Fiscal Crises: A 
History, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 2, at 9. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 19. 
 12.  Id. 
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nearly ubiquitous balanced-budget amendments, never successful at 
the federal level but wildly popular among the states.13 Third is a 
constitutionally mandated “rainy day fund,” which requires the states 
to put away money in good years and then draw on that money in 
harder times.14 And fourth are tax and expenditure limits that either 
link the fates of tax and expenditure levels or raise procedural 
barriers to changing tax or expenditure levels, such as allowing tax 
increases only through supermajority voting.15 
There is another class of fiscal constitutions, however, that is the 
inverse of the categories Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis identify. This 
class contains constitutional amendments mandating that the annual 
state budget devote a fixed percentage of resources to a given cause 
or activity. The quintessential example is California’s Proposition 98, a 
referendum passed in 1988 that requires the state legislature to 
devote a fixed amount of the budget to education, subject to different 
constraints depending on the state’s general economic outlook.16 
Proposition 22—the Local Taxpayer, Public Safety, and Transportation 
Act (2010)17—is another example, though it is structured differently. 
Proposition 22 banned the state from “borrowing” funds raised 
primarily from local taxes for any purpose other than local public 
safety, emergency response, or other local government services.  
However guided or misguided the aims of Proposition 98, 
Proposition 22, and other similarly structured popular amendments, 
the budgetary restriction is clear. Indeed, such restrictions are the 
very point of the proposition: no matter what other competing 
budgetary goals, California must, in the example of Proposition 98, 
 
 13.  Of all the states, only Vermont and Wyoming lack such amendments, and even 
Wyoming is “required to balance in practice.” GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE GAO/AFMD-93-
58BR, BALANCED BUDGET REQUIREMENTS: STATE EXPERIENCES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 3 & n.3 (1993), available at http://gao.gov/assets/80/78648.pdf.  
 14.  Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 9, at 19. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Cal. Proposition 98: Sch. Funding Initiative Constitutional Amend. and Statute, 
reprinted in California Ballot Pamphlet 79, 127–28 (1988), available at 
http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/1988g.pdf (showing that upon passage of Proposition 98, 
during normal economic times forty percent of the state general fund will be spent on 
kindergarten through community-college education).  
 17.  Cal. Proposition 22: Prohibits the State From Borrowing or Taking Funds Used for 
Transp., Redevelopment, or Local Gov’t Projects and Services. Initiative Constitutional 
Amend. 30 (2010), available at http://library.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (showing that 
upon passage of Proposition 22, California would be prohibited, even during a period of severe 
fiscal hardship, from delaying the distribution of tax revenues for transportation, 
redevelopment, or local government projects and services). 
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pay as much as forty percent of its annual budget to public education. 
Or in the example of Proposition 22, it may not remove local tax 
revenues from hotel or sales taxes to fund state services in other areas 
of the state.18 
These kinds of specific budgetary restrictions appear to be 
relatively rare among California’s constitutional amendments. But 
that is not to say that all other instances of direct democracy are 
fiscally innocuous. Indeed, many such propositions are costly even 
without tying up a fixed percentage of the budget. The annual parade 
of propositions that would amend the state constitution may 
adversely impact the public fisc in myriad ways, whether that impact is 
felt directly on the public resources that must be devoted to fund the 
propositions or indirectly through the requirements that compliance 
imposes on private actors.19 
Many states that allow for constitutional amendment via popular 
referendum specifically require a “fiscal impact statement” to 
accompany proposed amendments.20 But fiscal impact statements are 
themselves necessarily speculative and substantively incomplete. A 
true fiscal impact statement would mention not only the potential cost 
of a given proposition, but also the ways in which that cost would 
require the elimination or subtraction of other services, an increase in 
taxes, or the increased likelihood of fiscal crisis. This is not a criticism 
of fiscal impact statements, but simply a recognition that voters at the 
ballot box—or, for that matter, legislators in the state capitol—are 
rarely best situated to recognize the cost of these amendments.  
 
 18.  For an entertaining illustration of the phenomenon of California’s popular referendum 
and fiscal crisis, see The Daily Show with Jon Stewart: California’s Direct Democracy Troubles 
(Comedy Central cable television broadcast Dec. 5, 2011), available at http://www.thedaily 
show.com/watch/mon-december-5-2011/california-s-direct-democracy-troubles.  
 19.  California’s Proposition 65, titled “The Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement 
Act,” provides a good example here. Initiative Measure, Proposition 65 (approved Nov. 4, 1986) 
(codified as amended at Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25, 249.5-.13 (West 1999 & Supp. 2001)), 
available at http://www.oehha.ca.gov/prop65/law/P65law72003.html. Proposition 65 requires 
business owners to give a “clear and reasonable warning” of any potential exposure to chemicals 
“known to the state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity” to any individual who may be 
exposed to such chemicals. Id. 
 20.  See, e.g., CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9005 (West 2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 295.015 
(West 2011); see also NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE NCSL 
I&R TASK FORCE 27 (2002), available at http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/ 
irtaskfc/IandR_report.pdf. 
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1. Moral Hazard and Fiscal Federalism 
The reason—in many ways, the only reason—that such fiscal 
constitutions are the business of anyone other than the state’s citizens 
is simple: in a federation, there is a high tendency for moral hazard 
based upon the expectation of subnational governmental bailout from 
the national government. This tendency is a corollary to the principle 
of fiscal federalism, long an aspect of discussion of federalism among 
economists and political scientists.21 Jonathan Rodden, the leading 
academic analyst of this phenomenon, describes the “dangerous 
equilibrium” of moral hazard in federations in these terms: 
The central government—because of its role in funding most 
provincial-level expenditures—cannot credibly commit to ignore 
the fiscal woes of troubled provincial governments, but because of 
its political composition, it also cannot cut off their access to 
borrowing. In these situations, semi-sovereign provincial 
governments can borrow with implicit federal guarantees and 
over-fish the common pool of national revenue, ultimately 
undermining the creditworthiness of the entire public sector.22 
Rodden describes this equilibrium using formal theory, case studies, 
and the reactions of credit-rating agencies to explain exactly how this 
implicit guarantee is formed and how individual governments—local 
and central—react in various circumstances.23 
Of course, there are a number of different ways in which systems 
can federate. The European Union under the Maastricht Treaty, the 
United States under the U.S. Constitution, the United States under 
the Articles of Confederation, and explicitly trade-centered 
federations like the North American Free Trade Agreement are just a 
few examples of different types of federations. But in instances where 
the federation has expressly or impliedly backstopped the fiscal 
affairs of its governmental subunits—regardless of the ties that 
connect the federation otherwise—there is the risk that a textbook 
example of moral hazard can arise. If the insolvent state has the 
promise—through a unified currency, economy, or polity—of support 
in time of fiscal distress, the tendency to engage in risky behavior will 
increase. The benefits of such behavior redound to individual states, 
 
 21.  For the original discussions of fiscal federalism, see generally WALLACE OATES, 
FISCAL FEDERALISM (1972) and RICHARD MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE: A 
STUDY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY (1959).  
 22.  RODDEN, supra note 3, at vi.  
 23.  Id. at 12, 47, 136. 
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the costs to the entire federation. There is ample reason that the 
bailouts of the states would either exacerbate this moral hazard or 
allow others to perceive such exacerbation and thus cause a 
groundswell of support for political change on this question.  
The particulars of how and when such moral hazard arises will 
vary according to context. Rodden describes one apparently 
necessary, though insufficient, condition as where “subnational 
governments rely on grants and revenue-sharing rather than 
independent local taxation.”24 Thus, the very participation of the 
federal government in the state’s provision of governmental services 
increases the likelihood of moral hazard, a topic addressed in greater 
detail below.  
The upshot from Rodden and others’ observations regarding 
moral hazard and fiscal federalism is simply that it exists, making the 
fiscal problems of subnational governments the potential fiscal 
problems of citizens throughout the federation. Thus, resolving these 
problems necessarily becomes a concern for the entire national 
government, and not simply the subnational government most 
directly affected.  
B. Financial Review Boards 
The fact that states have changed their constitutions in ways that 
reflect fiscal rigidity is not an indictment of that process. There is 
nothing untoward or irrational about a populace’s interest in lashing 
state legislators to the mast in order to guarantee the provision of 
certain services in the future. That is the very essence of a Ulysses 
contract, which is an accepted view of what constitutional law is and 
does.25 
Indeed, such legal precommitments are not ipso facto fiscally 
dangerous. The problem is that they can quickly become dangerous, 
especially as economic conditions deteriorate. And while the crisis 
 
 24.  Id. at 12. 
 25.  For more on lawmaking as a Ulysses contract, see JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: 
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (describing the nature 
of precommitments generally); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 
(2011) (discussing the weaknesses of law as a precommitment device in the context of private 
bailouts); Peter Conti-Brown & Ronald J. Gilson, The Limits of Independence in Institutional 
Design (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing precommitments in 
institutional design). For a discussion of such precommitment devices in the context of 
constitutional law, see Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1631, 1643 (2009).  
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among the states may well be overstated,26 the risk of crisis is 
unquestionably exacerbated by the presence of such policies.  
In the event that such restrictions prove more than a state could 
handle, it would seem reasonable to seek to restore the budgetary 
flexibility that such referenda have removed. A potential means of 
doing so would be through a legislative veto of some or all such 
referenda themselves. But this is an undesirable mechanism for 
handling the problem of budgetary inflexibility. The entire point of 
legislating—or amending the constitution, as the case may be—by 
referendum is that the usual process of representative democracy has 
come under question. Allowing legislators to veto the voters would 
subvert the very point of direct democracy. Perhaps allowing 
legislators to enervate the direct democracy process is a desirable 
policy outcome. But if a state’s citizens have become suspicious of the 
mechanisms of popular referenda writ large, perhaps a more 
reasonable constitutional device would be to remove direct 
democracy from the picture entirely, rather than attempt a hybrid 
system that, ultimately, removes direct democracy in effect without 
doing so in fact. In other words, legislative veto of a popular 
referendum is no popular referendum at all.  
This essay takes a different tack and would seek that “veto” only 
on the condition that a crisis does, in fact, exist. In such an event, the 
veto would not reside in the state legislature, but in the hands of an 
appointed commission. To understand how that process works, it is 
helpful to understand Financial Review Boards, an analogue from 
municipal bankruptcy.27 
Financial Review Boards are designed to require a bankrupt 
municipality to subject its fiscal affairs to an outside authority, 
consisting primarily of delegates of the state government. They are 
creatures of the state, in some cases designed on an ad hoc basis as 
specific state agencies.28 Financial Review Boards have been used in 
 
 26.  Rodriguez-Tejedo and Wallis place the states’ fiscal crisis in historical perspective and 
demonstrate that the American states have proven remarkably consistent in paying their debts 
as they come due. Rodriguez-Tejedo & Wallis, supra note 9, at 11–14.  
 27.  I use the term Financial Review Boards, but the term more often deployed is 
“Financial Control Board.” See Financial Control Boards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
D.C. of the Comm. on Gov’t Reform & Oversight H.R., 104th Cong. 57 (1995) [hereinafter 
Hearings]. I prefer “review” in the context of federal-state relations, because of its emphasis on 
the nature of the federal power being used.  
 28.  See the case of the Bridgeport Financial Review Board, described more fully in 
Dorothy A. Brown, Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case 
Study in Reclaiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625, 630–32 (1995) (describing how 
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the context of municipal bankruptcies in at least Connecticut,29 New 
Jersey,30 New York City,31 and Philadelphia,32 but are far from 
widespread. California, for example, does not appear to use them.33 
In addition to their relative lack of use, the Boards are something 
of a curious beast in the municipal bankruptcy context. Federal law 
provides for municipal bankruptcy,34 but the Bankruptcy Code does 
not require that such boards be established: where they exist, they are 
state entities, not federal ones. From a multilevel governmental 
perspective, this is perhaps as it should be. The constitutional 
justification for municipal bankruptcy is that municipalities are 
corporate entities that are subunits of the states in which they reside 
and do not of themselves possess sovereignty of the sort recognized 
by the U.S. Constitution. That the sovereigns presiding over these 
corporate entities might want to impose a mechanism of 
accountability over bankrupt subentities seems plausible, even 
desirable. At the very least, the presence of Financial Review Boards 
in the municipal bankruptcy context is certainly less controversial 
than the idea that the federal government could impose a similar 
institution to oversee the fiscal affairs of the sovereign states.  
The use of a Financial Review Board in Bridgeport, Connecticut, 
is illustrative. In 1988, when local Bridgeport officials refused to deal 
with the city’s mounting fiscal distress and maintain the required 
balanced budget,35 the Connecticut legislature passed a Special Act 
creating the Bridgeport Financial Review Board (the Board) to 
 
the State Assembly of Connecticut created a Financial Review Board to oversee Bridgeport’s 
fiscal activities after city officials failed to address the city’s financial crisis). 
 29.  Id. at 630. 
 30.  Anne Marie Vassallo, Solving Camden’s Crisis: Makeover or Takeover?, 33 RUTGERS 
L.J. 185, 204 (2001).  
 31.  See WILLIAM K. TABB, THE LONG DEFAULT: NEW YORK CITY AND THE URBAN 
FISCAL CRISIS 28–31 (1982) (describing the austerity measures instituted by the Fiscal Control 
Board).  
 32.  Hearings, supra note 27, at 57 (statement of Bernard E. Anderson, Former Chairman, 
Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperative Authority). 
 33.  The (in)famous bankruptcy of Orange County in 1993 did not include a Financial 
Review Board. Mark Baldassare’s history of the county’s bankruptcy contains no reference to 
either financial review or financial control boards. See generally MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY (1998).  
 34.  At first, the Supreme Court invalidated this controversial mechanism. Ashton v. 
Cameron Cnty. Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531–32 (1936). In what can truly be called a 
“switch in time,” however, the Supreme Court upheld a substantively identical statutory scheme 
just two years later. See United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27, 49–51 (1938). 
 35.  Brown, supra note 28, at 630. 
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oversee the city’s fiscal affairs.36 The Board consisted originally of nine 
members, six of whom were either state officials or appointed by state 
officials.37 In exchange for state guarantees for Bridgeport’s debt, 
which allowed the city to continue to finance its deficits, Bridgeport 
ceded almost all control over its budget-making process.38 The city had 
to submit its annual budget to the Board, which could determine 
whether the budget comported with the Special Act’s requirements.39 
Under certain circumstances, the Board could adopt an alternative 
budget for the city.40 
The use of Financial Review Boards will vary with the states that 
authorize them.41 The general idea, for the purposes of this essay, is 
simply that a group of policy-makers is given the authority to weigh in 
on the fiscal processes of a subgovernmental unit. The fact that the 
relationship between cities and states is very different from that 
between states and federal governments, from the perspective of 
constitutional law, will mean that a state Financial Review Board will 
look quite different. The next Part explains how.  
II. THE FISCAL RESTORATION COMMISSION 
Borrowing from the concept of the Financial Review Board, this 
essay proposes the creation of a Fiscal Restoration Commission 
(FRC). In the proposal that follows, the essay makes three conceptual 
assumptions. The first is that there is, in fact, a fiscal crisis that requires 
some sort of state budgetary restructuring beyond the conventional, 
legislative means of doing so. The essay expresses no opinion on the 
accuracy of that assumption. Declining to do so highlights that the 
state of the emergency is far from a closed question: agnosticism 
regarding a state crisis, in the face of the states’ mounting debts, is to 
remain open to the possibility that either states’ debts are not 
ultimately excessive, or that the states are already well equipped, 
outside the context of a crisis, to deal with those debts without putting 
 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 630–31 (citing Act of June 9, 1988, 1988 Conn. Spec. Acts 88-80 (An Act 
Authorizing the Issuance of Bonds by the Town and City of Bridgeport), amended by Act of 
June 5, 1989, 1989 Conn. Spec. Acts 89-24; Act of June 27, 1989, 1989 Conn. Spec. Acts 89-47; 
Act of June 6, 1990, 1990 Conn. Spec. Acts 90-31; Act of June 10, 1991, 1991 Conn. Spec. Acts 
91-40). 
 38.  Id. at 631–32. 
 39.  Id. at 632. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  For more discussion on this point, see Hearings, supra note 27, at 68–69.  
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the burdens on the federal government. This agnosticism is not to say 
that state fiscal crises cannot occur, only to say that the crisis may not 
have already occurred.  
Second, this essay assumes that if such a fiscal crisis does occur, it 
will be related to the budgetary rigidity associated with popular 
referenda, the difficulty of reaching budgetary compromises in the 
face of mandatory supermajority voting requirements, or both. This is 
an empirical question that appears to have been addressed only 
partially, and not since the most recent fiscal crisis.42 Further 
exploration would be a promising vein for future empirical research.  
And third, the essay assumes that a failure to resolve a fiscal crisis 
in a state within a federation creates a moral hazard, as the federation 
is likely to cover the losses of the state, thereby dispersing the costs 
and concentrating the benefits of such risk-taking. This assumption 
appears to be the least contestable of the three.43 
If these three assumptions are correct today, or plausibly correct 
tomorrow, a solution is in order that will allow states to restructure 
their liabilities in a way that will reach the cause of the fiscal 
problems, rather than merely the symptoms of those problems. The 
FRC is such a proposal. This Part explains its features.  
A. Federal Statutory Authorization 
The FRC would require one federal and two state statutory 
triggers. First, with regard to the federal statutory authorization, the 
creation of a federal commission charged with recommending 
budgetary changes could—in theory—be done by either statute or 
executive order. The ill-fated National Commission on Fiscal 
Responsibility and Reform, better known as the Bowles-Simpson 
Commission after its co-chairmen, is an example of an executive 
agency created without congressional authorization.44 The 
Commission was charged with proposing a dramatic restructuring of 
the federal budget; it produced a report but was not embraced.  
The FRC should be a creature of Congress and not the Executive 
for at least three reasons. First, the FRC’s creation is explicitly linked 
to the deployment of federal funds. And while the deployment of 
 
 42.  See generally Matsusaka, supra note 8 (addressing the restraints imposed by budgetary 
referenda). 
 43.  See supra Part I.A. 
 44.  Exec. Order No. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7927–28 (Feb. 18, 2010). 
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federal funds has not always been initiated in Congress—for example, 
the Federal Reserve’s deployment of funds in the rescue of Bear 
Stearns45 and AIG,46 or the Treasury’s use of funds in the bailout of the 
Mexican peso47—a politically controversial move of the magnitude of 
a federal bailout of a state will require the accountability associated 
with congressional approval.  
Second, there is no obvious candidate for already established 
bailout funds currently within the reach of the Executive, unless the 
American states are deemed systemically important financial 
institutions for purposes of Dodd-Frank.48 This, however, seems a 
stretch, given the dubious legality of deeming the automakers 
“financial institutions”49 for purposes of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program,50 and Dodd-Frank’s further clarification that financial 
institutions are only those whose consolidated revenues are 
primarily—defined as “eighty-five percent”—“financial in nature.”51 
Whatever a state’s fiscal commitments, such a categorization is facially 
absurd.  
And third, the FRC can and should be created preemptively, in 
anticipation of the first state-level statutory authorization described 
above. That is, Congress could legislate in times of non-crisis to create 
this infrastructure, which would then be triggered by the passage of 
the “fiscal state of emergency” referendum. The latent commission 
would then spring into action, with any necessarily contingent 
appointments left to the Executive as appropriate. There could be 
constitutional concerns if the President creates a commission by 
executive fiat that is not pursuant to any kind of legislative 
 
 45.  See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How To Prevent Hard Cases from Making Bad 
Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713, 717–20 (2009) 
(describing how the Federal Reserve worked with other parties, such as J.P. Morgan, to provide 
funding to stave off Bear Stearns’ collapse). 
 46.  See generally William K. Sjostrom, Jr., The AIG Bailout, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 
(2009) (describing the terms of the AIG bailout). 
 47.  Alan Friedman, For Its Loans, Mexico Will Pay A Weighty Price in Sovereignty: The 
Rescue of the Peso: A Humbling Experience, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1995/02/02/news/02iht-imf.html?scp=14&sq=1995%20mexico&st=cse. 
 48.  See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 5331(a), 5323 (West 2010) (describing the different kinds of 
systemically important financial institutions that the Financial Stability Oversight Council will 
regulate).  
 49.  See Cong. Oversight Panel, September Insight Report: The Use of TARP Funds in the 
Support and Reorganization of the Domestic Automotive Industry 71–77 (2009), available at 
http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402043042/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
090909-report.pdf (including an exhaustive analysis of that strained interpretation). 
 50.  Troubled Asset Relief Program, Pub. L. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).  
 51.  § 201(a)(11)(iii), (iv); §201(b). 
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authorization and remains a latent solution to a problem that has, by 
its own terms, yet to arise.  
The features of the FRC would be formal and structural, and 
would focus almost entirely on the ways in which the members are 
appointed. None of the features discussed below is sacred, but for the 
purposes of comprehensibility, I will describe several features in 
detail.  
First, because the FRC deals so obviously with highly charged 
political issues, it is desirable to create as independent a commission 
as possible.52 The important first step would be the appointment of the 
FRC’s co-chairs, one from each party. The statute could direct the 
President to appoint, by executive order—without the advice or 
consent of the Senate, as this would not be a federal officer—the first 
co-chair. That appointment would, by necessity, be a member of the 
other political party. The presidentially appointed co-chair would then 
appoint the other co-chair, a member of the President’s party. The 
idea here is that the President will appoint a moderate, independent-
minded member of the other party. That independent co-chair would 
then choose a partner from the other party. The two would then 
constitute the entire commission.  
The two-person commission is a departure from other models, 
such as those used in Financial Review Boards or in other federal 
agencies. Such a departure is desirable. The point here is to give the 
FRC accountability but also to eliminate, to the extent possible, the 
likelihood that it would replicate the political dysfunction of the home 
state’s own political structure.  
The two co-chairs would then appoint a nonpartisan staff, and the 
appointment of each staff member would require the consent of both 
co-chairs. That staff should be as technocratic as possible, reflecting 
relevant disciplinary expertise (economics, accounting, law, etc.) and 
substantive, area-specific expertise (such as the California budget, 
California constitutional law, etc.). The benefit of a fully technocratic 
staff is not necessarily a vaunted view of technocrats. Rather, this 
preference reflects the skeptical view that a more robustly apolitical 
process is more likely to yield results that a politicized polity will 
respect. The anti-model here is the recent Financial Crisis Inquiry 
 
 52.  See Conti-Brown & Gilson, supra note 25, for more discussion of the nature of 
independence in institutional design.  
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Commission (FCIC). The FCIC has largely been deemed a failure.53 
While some of this criticism draws unnecessarily rosy comparisons to 
previous commissions,54 the reality is that the partisan reports that the 
FCIC issued enervated its ultimate conclusions. Furthermore, the 
appointment of almost all politicians or former high-level political 
appointees among the FCIC—many of whom are young enough to 
seek to make a political career on the basis of their work at the 
FCIC—led to a more divided report than might have been possible 
otherwise. By creating a two-headed commission appointed in the 
way described, the likelihood of partisan bickering would be low and 
accountability high. This would thus increase the likelihood of a 
successful, unanimous report.  
But there is yet more that can be done, starting with the ways that 
the co-chairs—and, importantly, their appointed staff—are 
compensated. The FCIC exemplifies the traditional compensation 
regime. Section 5(f)(1) of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act 
of 2009, which created the FCIC, provides that “[e]ach member of the 
Commission may be compensated at a rate not to exceed the daily 
equivalent of the annual rate of basic pay in effect for a position at 
level IV of the Executive Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, 
United States Code.”55 In the FRC, the co-chairs of the commission 
and their staff would be compensated also by reference to the 
Executive Schedule, but with the following statutory variations: 
(2) In the event the Commission fails to file a comprehensive 
report in which both co-chairs concur, the compensation for co-
chairs and staff will be half the rate for level IV of the Executive 
Schedule under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code. In the 
event the Commission does file a comprehensive report in which 
both co-chairs concur, the compensation for co-chairs and staff will 
be twice the rate for level IV of the Executive Schedule under 
section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.  
This statutory variation would encourage a comprehensive, 
unanimous report. The reason to link the staff’s compensation to the 
 
 53.  See, e.g., Tim Fernholz, The Failure of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission—and 
of Facts, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 15, 2010), http://prospect.org/article/failure-financial-crisis-
inquiry-commission-and-facts (arguing that partisanship obstructed the commission from 
achieving its primary objective of determining what happened in the crisis). 
 54.  See generally Peter Conti-Brown, The Accidental History of Federal Banking and 
Securities Laws: A Review of Michael Perino’s The Hellhound of Wall Street: How Ferdinand 
Pecora’s Investigation of the Great Crash Forever Changed American Finance, 39 SEC. REG. 
L.J. 45 (2011) (drawing comparisons to the Pecora Commission).  
 55.  Pub. L. 111-21, § 5(f)(1), 123 Stat. 1617 (2009). 
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success of the report is to mitigate the risk that wealthy co-chairs 
might engage in political grandstanding, since the five- or six-figure 
compensation for their work might not be sufficient to discourage 
such politicking. If, on the other hand, their entire staff will suffer, the 
social incentive hopefully will be sufficient to induce unanimity.  
The importance of unanimity is simply to avoid the appearance 
that the report, or the process that created it, was a reflection of 
partisan politics. The more confidence the public, and especially the 
voting public in the relevant state, can have in the FRC, the more 
likely its recommendations will be adopted by that public.  
One final important point about the federal authorization of the 
FRC: it is essential that the creation of the commission be linked to 
federal dollars deployed to guarantee state debts, and that the statute 
clearly state that no federal funds would be deployed to guarantee 
debt without acceptance of the FRC’s report. Query whether such 
precommitments are actually effective or plausible;56 the point is not 
to eliminate forever the possibility that such a bailout would occur 
outside the context of FRC, but to increase the political costs for 
doing so. There may be merit to the alternative course, which would 
allow the creation of an FRC when a crisis is not directly bearing 
down on the state. But I am not convinced that this is the best course. 
The idea behind the present proposal is that there must be a fiscal 
crisis that the regular political process cannot resolve. Limiting the 
establishment of the FRC to respond to actual crises would help 
ensure that a request for federal funds will bring with it some federal 
power to dictate the terms upon which such funds will be deployed.  
In this sense, a federal bailout of an American state subject to the 
conditions of an FRC would look more like the private bailouts of 
2008 to 2010. Although hugely unpopular, they have almost all been 
revenue-positive for the U.S. government.57 The reason, in part, is that 
a bailout in this context mostly meant the power to dictate which 
assets were bought and sold, which executives could stay or must go, 
and other such decisions. In the context of federalism and the 
sovereignty of the American states, these kinds of demands are 
impossible without a structure that allows the sovereign to accede to 
such demands. The FRC—including the state statutory authorization 
 
 56.  Levitin, supra note 25, at 483–84.  
 57.  See Peter Conti-Brown, Elective Shareholder Liability, 64 STAN. L. REV. 409, 447–48 
(2012), for an overview of this issue.  
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and adoption—is that structure and allows the federal government to 
place these conditions on the expenditure of its funds.  
B. State Statutory and Constitutional Authorizations 
There would be two state triggers to the creation of the FRC: one 
would precede the creation and the other would accept or reject  the 
FRC’s proposal. The first would entail a constitutional amendment by 
referendum that would read along the following lines: 
Section 1. The State of [California] hereby declares a budgetary 
emergency, and authorizes the creation of the Fiscal Restoration 
Commission, with members appointed as required by federal law.  
Section 2. A special referendum shall be scheduled for the first 
Tuesday after 30 days following the release of the FRC’s report. 
That referendum will read as follows: 
“The duly authorized federal Fiscal Restoration Commission 
has released its report, which would change [California] 
law—including by amending the [California] Constitution. 
That report is available at http://www.fiscalrestoration[ca]. 
gov/fullreport/. The FRC’s full report is accepted in its 
entirety, and given the force of statutory and constitutional 
law, as specified in that report.” 
Section 3. Failure to adopt the FRC’s full report will preclude any 
federal governmental assistance to satisfy the exclusive debts of 
the state.  
Three points are worth highlighting here. First, the state trigger is 
done by initiative. The state’s legislature must be deemed, by the 
people themselves, to have failed to resolve the budgetary crisis. 
Second, the vote to accept or reject the FRC’s report must be 
complete. There must be no partial acceptance of the FRC’s report, 
unless done so by the state legislature (or through another 
referendum, which must occur through the usual means), which would 
use the publicly available FRC report as persuasive authority in its 
own regular lawmaking. Third, the acceptance of the FRC’s report 
must be the necessary prerequisite to the receipt of federal funds to 
guarantee the state’s liabilities; this would be acknowledged both by 
the state referendum and the federal statute.  
The timing of the statute would be as follows: the federal 
authorization would allow the federal government to backstop an 
individual state’s debts only via the adoption of the FRC, with plenary 
authority to propose statutory and constitutional changes where 
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necessary. The state would then initiate its “state of fiscal emergency,” 
request the deployment of federal funds on its behalf, and commit to 
adopting the FRC’s report as a condition of receiving federal funds. 
The FRC would produce its report, and a second referendum would 
accept or reject it in its entirety.  
C. Benefits 
The benefits of the FRC model are several. The model allows a 
clearing of the cluttered fiscal desk of the state’s budget-making. It 
raises the costs of seeking federal funds, thus mitigating the moral 
hazard associated with fiscal federalism. And, although I remain 
skeptical of the law’s ability to enforce ironclad precommitments, it at 
least raises the political cost of reneging on those precommitments.  
Perhaps most meaningfully, it allows the problem of too much law, 
and any directly related fiscal crises, to become truly ripe. This vitiates 
the ability of partisans to create a crisis at the expense of political 
opponents. This is not a foregone conclusion. John G. Matsusaka, for 
example, has presented evidence consistent with the view that direct 
democracy restricts only a third of the state budget and directs funds 
to ends that the legislature would already support in the amounts 
required.58 Matsusaka’s analysis is important and helpful, and this 
proposal is not inconsistent with those findings. By using direct 
democracy to address this problem, it waits for a problem to exist. 
This is markedly different than a regime imposed on the states 
without their initiation.  
Moreover, the FRC provides helpful political cover to those state 
actors who would advocate for certain fiscally prudent positions 
consistent with their values, but feel that they cannot do so without 
offending various constituencies. Bernard Anderson—the former 
chairman of the Pennsylvania Intergovernmental Cooperation 
Authority, the Financial Control Board set up in 1991 to supervise 
Philadelphia’s finances—explained his Board’s successes in this way: 
I would say that part of the reason we were successful is that an 
oversight board of the type we have gives elected officials the 
political cover they need to make unpopular choices and to control 
spending. In other words, the oversight board, in effect, is a heat 
shield. The mayor [and] members of the city council can make 
 
 58.  See generally Matsusaka, supra note 8 (demonstrating that voter initiatives took up 
only thirty-three percent of California’s spending in 2009–10). 
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decisions on spending and blame it on the board because they 
don’t have any choice in the matter, and this can be a very useful 
device for allowing the city to reduce payrolls, to eliminate 
services, to restructure government, to introduce new management 
techniques, to renegotiate labor contracts and do all other things 
that are necessary.59 
Providing cover to politicians afraid to do their jobs is not normally 
considered a virtue in a policy proposal, but in this context, it is 
exactly that.  
III. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
The FRC proposal outlined above is certainly bold, but it is also 
sound as a matter of law and policy. Part III explains why, on both 
counts.  
A. Constitutional Arguments: Sovereignty 
Critics may argue that the proposed structure would render a 
sovereign state’s entire fiscal structure subject to the plenary veto of 
two politicians and their technocratic, bureaucratic staff. It is thus 
hardly a badge of respect to the states’ ability to determine their own 
futures under principles of federalism. But I think the mechanisms 
just described fully respect the sovereignty of the states. The adoption 
of the FRC model is entirely voluntary at two stages: the states must 
seek the help of the federal government by referendum and then 
must accept that help through authorized means of constitutional 
amendment. The first referendum must cede the authority to create 
wholesale changes to the state’s fiscal laws; the second must then 
approve the FRC package without modification. If sovereignty in the 
states that rely on direct democracy resides with the people 
themselves, then the people themselves can legislate as they please so 
long as no other federal constitutional prohibitions are triggered.  
To understand the limits of the federalism critique of this 
proposal, consider a thought experiment. Suppose Iceland has made a 
mess of things and is in dire need of getting its fiscal house in order. 
Politicians lack confidence in their own ability to do so, leading them 
to seek assistance from their creditors—mostly the English, in various 
public and private capacities. To do so, the English impose a set of 
conditions that if unmet will preclude assistance. Has Iceland’s 
 
 59.  Hearings, supra note 27, at 68–69. 
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sovereignty been abridged? 
The answer is obviously no, and the analogy is not hypothetical.60 
Nor would one find that sovereignty had been abridged in the other 
equally applicable analogies of Greece vis-à-vis the European Union 
(EU); Argentina vis-à-vis the International Monetary Fund (IMF); or 
heavily indebted African countries vis-à-vis the World Bank and its 
bilateral creditors. Of course, the relationship between California and 
the United States is not the same as Iceland and the UK, Greece and 
the EU, or Argentina and the IMF, but the analogy between these 
sovereign interactions and the ones contemplated by the FRC 
proposal is sufficiently apt.  
That said, the proposal here would no doubt trigger significant 
criticism on these grounds. The nature of federalism in the United 
States remains, of course, one of the most widely and hotly argued 
topics in both academic and public spheres—consider, for example, 
the recent debates over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care 
Act’s Medicaid expansion.61 Congress has long had the ability to make 
conditional federal grants to state governments subject to the limits of 
the Spending Clause62 of the Constitution.63 The Supreme Court 
identified these limits in South Dakota v. Dole.64 The limits are five: 
(1) the condition must be in pursuit of the general welfare of the 
United States, a question on which “courts should defer substantially 
 
 60. A Parable of Two Debtors: Does Iceland Hold Lessons for Ireland and the Rest of 
Troubled Europe?, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18557977. 
 61.  See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Health Care, Part IV—The Medicaid 
Expansion, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/ 
argument-preview-health-care-part-iv-the-medicaid-expansion/ (describing the “angry public 
discourse” over limited government in the healthcare debate). 
 62.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, 
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and 
general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform 
throughout the United States.”). 
 63.  See Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947) (explaining that 
“[w]hile the United States is not concerned with and has no power to regulate local political 
activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms upon which its money 
allotments to states shall be disbursed”). For academic discussion of these questions, see 
generally Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal Spending and States’ Rights, 574 ANNALS 104 (2001) 
(explaining why the Supreme Court will likely reconsider South Dakota v. Dole’s germaneness 
test); Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism’s Trojan Horse, 
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85 (1988) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. 
Dole has subverted basic principles of federalism); Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal 
Spending and the Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987) (arguing that the conditional 
spending power’s invalid intrusion test requires closer scrutiny).  
 64.  483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
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to the judgment of Congress;”65 (2) “if Congress desires to condition 
the States’ receipt of federal funds, it must do so unambiguously;”66 
(3) the condition must relate “to the federal interest in particular 
national projects or programs;”67 (4) the condition cannot 
independently violate another constitutional provision;68 and (5) the 
condition cannot be “so coercive as to pass the point at which 
pressure turns into compulsion.”69 
The FRC and the associated legislative enactment satisfy the Dole 
test, in each case but one, by obvious implication in no need of further 
elaboration. The protection of the federal fisc is appropriately within 
the “general welfare” of the United States. The entire point of the 
FRC is to make the condition “unambiguous.”70 The federal interest in 
preventing state bailouts is centrally related to the condition. There is 
no obvious alternative provision of the Constitution that the FRC 
would violate.  
The only potential argument is that conditioning the grant of 
federal funds for a state bailout on the acceptance of the FRC’s 
report may be sufficiently coercive to render it unconstitutional. 
Again, at the time of this essay’s publication, the “coercion” element 
of South Dakota v. Dole remains unsettled and will be clarified by the 
Supreme Court’s historic consideration of the Obama 
Administration’s healthcare law.  
At present, though, the element of coercion is not established in 
the context of the FRC. To conclude otherwise would be to assert that 
the alternative to the federal condition—that the state must resolve 
its own fiscal problems, including whatever problems the fiscal 
constitutions created via direct democracy—is so unsatisfactory that 
the promise of federal money coerces the state’s compliance with the 
FRC. This Hobson’s choice argument is unpersuasive, and indeed, 
 
 65.  Id. at 207.  
 66.  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 67.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 68.  Id.  
 69.  Id. at 211. 
 70.  The preamble of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
for example, tells us that it is designed to “end ‘too big to fail’” and “to protect the American 
taxpayer by ending bailouts.” Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 
12 U.S.C.A § 5301). Section 214 (“Prohibition on Taxpayer Funding”) further guarantees that 
“taxpayers shall bear no losses from the exercise of any authority under this title.” Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 214(c), 124 Stat. 1518 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.A § 5394). There is no 
reason, given the political toxicity of the idea of bailouts, that we would expect congressional 
statutory drafters to be coy in allowing, preemptively, for congressional bailouts. 
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suggests limits to state sovereignty that the Constitution does not 
sanction. The coercion argument just described makes the states 
passive actors in their own fiscal policy-making. Instead, the FRC 
allows for a legitimate choice between two competing restructuring 
regimes: either use the tools already available to the state—default, 
tax increases, spending decreases, etc.—or use the federal government 
as a guarantor subject to the requirements that the state’s fiscal and 
legal house be put in order. This essay leaves further elucidation of 
these squarely constitutional arguments to constitutional scholars, but 
does not concede that the FRC statutory scheme described above 
comes close to the line of “coercion,” wherever that line may reside.  
Voluntary cession of this kind of authority is not uncontroversial 
in the context of state bankruptcy,71 which is also doubly voluntary in 
the sense that the state has the authority both to seek bankruptcy 
protection and then to propose its new plan itself. But the 
voluntariness of the FRC is even more protective of state sovereignty 
in two respects. First, in bankruptcy, for example, the state proposes 
the reorganization plan, but must abide by the plan’s final 
adjudication by federal courts including, ultimately, the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Here, the final adjudication is performed by the voting citizens 
of the state. Although parties whose interests are harmed by the 
legislative or constitutional reorganization that an FRC plan might 
entail may have recourse to the federal courts, as would any party 
jilted by the exercise of state governmental authority, that judicial 
review will be much more limited. The cession of control by the states 
in an FRC-style proposal is consequently, at least in the context of 
adjudication, less complete than is the case in state bankruptcy. And 
in the context of fiscal policy-making, such limited judicial review is 
very desirable indeed.  
Second, the FRC proposal is more respectful of state sovereignty 
by putting the question of federal delegation—to courts in state 
bankruptcy, to the FRC in the proposal described above—to the 
source of the state sovereignty: the people, not the legislature. If it is 
the case that the state fiscal policy apparatus is deeply dysfunctional, 
allowing the state to prepare the reorganization plan may create the 
same political pressures that put the state in uncertain legal footing in 
the first place. This is not necessarily so: again, state bankruptcy seeks 
 
 71.  Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States: Is It Constitutional?, in 
WHEN STATES GO BROKE, supra note 2, at 232–35. 
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to address a fundamentally different problem than the one 
contemplated in this essay. But to the extent that there is overlap, 
state bankruptcy proposals that are initiated through the political 
process that created the crisis in the first place may face significant 
barriers to their success.  
B. Contract Clause 
The constitutional concern that has the most traction is that the 
Commission’s recommendation would include adjustments to the 
state’s contracts that would violate the Contract Clause of the 
Constitution.72 This is a concern, especially to the extent that the FRC 
must change the contracts already in place, say, with employees or 
bondholders.  
This is a strong argument: the Contract Clause would 
unquestionably restrict the FRC in what it could propose. The reason 
that such a flaw is not fatal is that the FRC includes the plenary 
power to do anything that is legally enforceable, since it represents a 
change of statute and state constitution by referendum. In other 
words, if it is possible for the state to change its employment contracts 
or default on its bonds outside the context of the FRC, it will be 
possible to do so within that context. This is not to say that such 
spurned creditors will not have judicial recourse, in the way that any 
change in law would similarly provide judicial recourse. This is an 
issue that future scholars—and, if this proposal gains any traction, 
policy-makers and, eventually, members of the FRC—will have to 
analyze more carefully. But the main point is the same: if it is possible 
to abridge a contract via statute (in the form of changing prospective 
pensions, employee benefits, interest rates, services, etc.), then so too 
would it be possible through the FRC.  
C. Why is the FRC Better than Bankruptcy? 
The leading alternative—and, it seems, almost exclusively 
academic—proposal is “state bankruptcy.” This proposal would 
modify the federal Bankruptcy Code to allow states voluntarily73 to 
file for bankruptcy, which would allow a bankruptcy court to 
adjudicate the claims of the states’ various creditors.  
 
 72.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the 
Obligation of Contracts.”). 
 73.  But see Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. 
CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 81 (2012) (arguing that voluntariness is not necessary). 
(9) CONTI-BROWN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012  1:26 PM 
2012] THE PROBLEM OF TOO MUCH LAW 67 
The essay has already addressed some of the concerns for state 
bankruptcy. But the emphasis on the comparison should be on the 
fact that the FRC is a complementary proposal, not a competitive one, 
and attempts to solve a fundamentally different problem: state 
bankruptcy seeks to resolve the problem of excess debt, and the FRC 
seeks to resolve the problem of excess law. But even to the extent that 
the two policies overlap, the FRC offers benefits that state bankruptcy 
proposals do not. To understand why, it is necessary first to note what 
problems the “state bankruptcy” label creates. A chorus of scholars 
have challenged its viability and advisability. As Anna Gelpern has 
argued, the very concept of state bankruptcy “flips the logical 
sequence: it posits an institutional fix for a theoretically undefined 
and empirically contested problem. As a result, a debate that should 
be filling gaps in public debt theory yields yet another chapter on the 
uses of bankruptcy.”74 Moreover, Gelpern argues, “the bankruptcy 
label presumptively narrows the inquiry, making creditor collective 
action problems and the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
play host to broader principles of fiscal policy and democratic 
governance,” leading to a “distort[ed]” policy conversation.75 Finally,  
the bankruptcy label injects the intellectual and political conflicts 
of bankruptcy into the world of public debt. “Bailout” and 
“cramdown” are fighting words in both worlds, but such overlaps 
are misleading. Talking about state debt as “state bankruptcy” sets 
the stage for replaying entrenched arguments from a different 
field, and threatens to derail a useful exchange for the wrong 
reasons.76  
State bankruptcy is thus, at best, a metaphor—and not necessarily an 
apt one—for the fiscal crises that states face. As Steven Schwarcz has 
put it, “extending municipal bankruptcy law to states . . . can bring in a 
lot of excess baggage.”77 
Schwarcz’s own solution would be what he terms a “minimalist” 
approach, which is essentially bankruptcy-lite: it places the authority 
to approve and finance the state’s restructuring in a “Supervisory 
Authority,” but with a more removed role in dictating the terms of the 
 
 74.  Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 
YALE L.J. 888, 891 (2012). 
 75.  Id. 
 76.  Id. at 891. 
 77.  Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 
322, 326 (2011).  
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renegotiation than would occur in state bankruptcy.78 
David Skeel, the leading academic proponent of a state 
bankruptcy proposal, recognizes the “baggage” that the label brings. 
He also critiques “the tendency to envision bankruptcy in monolithic 
terms, as a single framework rather than a wide range of possible 
restructuring mechanisms.”79 To the extent that state bankruptcy 
represents that “wide range,” even the FRC fits within these 
proposals. In that sense, the debate over state bankruptcy is better 
cast as between those who believe that there should be a model for 
debt restructuring of any kind, regardless of the involvement of the 
federal government, and those who think there should not. The finer 
points of the debate sometimes get lost in the problem of labeling that 
both Gelpern and Skeel have identified.  
The fact that the FRC proposal and the proposals of Skeel, 
Schwarcz, and others who advocate a form of state bankruptcy are 
part of the same recognition—that there may be a problem with state 
debt that the usual process cannot resolve—partially illustrates why 
the FRC proposal is not incompatible with state bankruptcy. But the 
complement is more pronounced even than that. Because state 
bankruptcy aims to eliminate state debt as opposed to state law, such 
proposals would fare better than the FRC at the renegotiation of 
specific, retroactive contracts because the FRC likely would be 
limited in doing so by the Contract Clause of the Constitution.  
The FRC addresses something different, and aims not simply at 
the symptoms of fiscal crises, but at their core. If the main problem 
with state fiscal crises is a broken system of fiscal constitutions, then 
renegotiation of debt will start the states back with the same broken 
system that likely will flare up at the next economic downturn. 
Perhaps the best solution, then, would be a mechanism like the FRC 
(by which laws can be cleared) legislated in tandem with a state 
reorganization mechanism (by which debts can be cleared).  
In this sense, the FRC proposal follows the suggestion of George 
Triantis that a state bankruptcy regime should be initiated by the 
states and not by the federal government.80 He argues: 
 
 
 78.  See id. at 351 n.153 (allowing the Supervisory Authority to impose conditionality 
pursuant to a back-to-back lending structure when funding has been privatized). 
 79.  Skeel, supra note 1, at 3.  
 80.  George Triantis, Bankruptcy for the States and by the States, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE, supra note 2, at 237. 
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The state bankruptcy process should be enacted by state 
legislation for the following reasons: (1) state circumstances and 
political preferences vary, and each state can tailor its bankruptcy 
process, (2) the state would internalize the cost of issuing debt 
under the bankruptcy regime of its choice and this would reduce 
the rent-seeking distortions in the legislative process, and (3) 
particularly if combined with federal legislation that is expressly a 
default, allowing states to pass their own, this may further 
minimize the pressures for a federal bailout in the future.81 
Because the FRC is state-initiated, even if federally approved, it 
allows for state tailoring that a top-down model would not. 
Essentially, one FRC’s recommendations for California would not be 
the same as a different FRC’s recommendations for, say, Colorado.  
D. The Federal Government Caused the Crisis 
A last critique of the FRC model, or indeed any other model, 
would be that the states did not cause their crises: the federal 
government did.82 The idea is that the federal government has shifted 
the fiscal burden of healthcare, welfare, education, and other services 
to the state governments, including through unfunded mandates. 
Recall Rodden’s argument that such entanglement of central and 
semi-autonomous regional governments in the provision of services 
leads to a greater likelihood of bailout.83 In light of that reality, why 
should the states be burdened with remaking their laws in order to 
accommodate a hostile federal government that created the crisis in 
the first place? 
To that argument, I have no answer, except to say that a state-
initiated recovery from budgetary restrictions strikes me as more 
plausible than a wholesale reversal of the defederalization of 
government benefits and services.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
This essay has made the preliminary case for a Fiscal Restoration 
Commission, a federal commission that would dictate, at the state’s 
 
 81.  Id. at 6. 
 82.  Damon Silvers, Obligations Without the Power to Fund Them: The Origins, 
Consequences, and Possible Solution to the Fiscal Crisis of the States, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE, supra note 2, at 1.  
 83.  See Jonathan Rodden, Market Discipline and U.S. Federalism, in WHEN STATES GO 
BROKE, supra note 2, at 143 (claiming that market discipline would be enhanced by efforts to 
disentangle obligations of federal and state governments). 
(9) CONTI-BROWN (DO NOT DELETE) 8/20/2012  1:26 PM 
70 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 7:1 
request and subject to the state’s approval, the statutes and 
constitutional provisions that have otherwise limited the state’s ability 
to put its fiscal house in order. It would be a law-clearing mechanism, 
not a debt-clearing one, which represents its main strengths and main 
weaknesses in allowing for meaningful resolution of fiscal crises. But 
it would also mitigate two real harms commonly discussed in the 
debate about the states’ fiscal situations. First, it requires that there 
actually be a crisis. As many commentators have observed, fiscal crises 
are political crises, not economic ones.84 While there is no question 
that the states face enormous pressure and sometimes significant 
budget shortfalls, the real question is whether the states have the 
political will to resolve these questions in ways that citizens will 
respect. In the event that the answer is no, the FRC can provide an 
alternative. Second, by making the provision of federal funds 
contingent on the adoption of the FRC’s report, the proposal here 
significantly lessens—though, almost certainly, does not eliminate—
the likelihood of federal bailouts of individual states, with the 
associated skewed incentives and moral hazard that results.  
 
 
 84.  E.g., Silvers, supra note 82, at 45; Levitin, supra note 25, at 214. 
